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INTRODUCTION
In 1873, the Supreme Court created a new "drastic and unusual
presumption"1 and made it applicable in cases of marine collision.
The presumption, now popularly known as the Pennsylvania Rule,2
allows a proponent of the Rule to place the burden of proof upon an
opposing party, when the proponent shows that the opponent was
in violation of a statute or regulation designed to prevent marine
collisions. This shift of the burden of proof not only encompasses the
shift in the burden of production traditional to most presumptions,
but also includes a shift of, as well as an increase in, the burden of
persuasion. Thus, the alleged statutory violator in a marine colli-
sion, the opponent of the Pennsylvania Rule, must show that her
violation could not have been a cause of the collision.3
In an era when shipwrecks often meant few survivors, the
Pennsylvania Rule served an important pragmatic function. The
Rule's vitality was justified in that it (1) made for convenient
adjudication; (2) allocated the burden of production equitably upon
the party who was, in fact, guilty of a statutory infraction; and (3)
upheld the proper policy motivations of deterring rule violations and
preserving maritime safety.4 The Rule's effectiveness as a deterrent
was particularly understandable when combined with the Divided
Damages Rule, which apportioned fault on a none, half, or all basis.5
In this regard, the Pennsylvania Rule was also often criticized as
being harsh and unfair,6 as the perpetrator of a minor statutory
infraction was, nevertheless, at risk of being forced to bear at least
half, if not all, of the loss should that party fail to rebut the
Pennsylvania Rule's unique presumption.
1. Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2004) (referring to the rule
announced in The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873)).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136.
4. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9 (1965), reprinted in EVIDENCE: CASES
AND MATERIALS 758-62 (Jon R. Waltz & Roger C. Park eds., updated 10th ed. 2005). See also
infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
5. See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854) (enunciating
the Divided Damages Rule).
6. See William L. Peck, The Pennsylvania Rule Since Reliable Transfer, 15 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 95, 96 (1984).
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All of this was changed when the Supreme Court, in 1975,
overruled the Divided Damages Rule in favor of a regime of
comparative fault.7 Today, it is said that the Pennsylvania Rule's
presumption may happily coexist within such a regime.' Neverthe-
less, this Note contends that despite the Pennsylvania Rule's
capability of coexisting within a regime of comparative fault, the
Rule should not coexist within such a regime, especially in light
of modern technology and recent case law. Part L.A of this Note
examines a brief history of the Pennsylvania Rule and the exact
1873 Supreme Court formulation of the Rule. Part I.B digs a little
deeper into understanding the Rule and explains why the Rule may
be best characterized as an "extra-strength" Morgan presumption.9
Part I.C takes the Part I.B understanding of the Pennsylvania Rule
and examines its interaction with both the Divided Damages Rule
and the post-1975 regime of comparative fault. In total, Part I of
this Note explains the basis for much of the debate surrounding the
Pennsylvania Rule and how the Rule was expected to function in the
post-1975 era of comparative fault.
Part II of this Note takes a case study approach to analyzing
how modern courts have dealt with the Pennsylvania Rule in light
of comparative fault. In particular, Part II notes that judicial
avoidance of the Rule's "drastic and unusual presumption"'" still
occurs in many district and circuit courts. In Part II.A, two tradi-
tional methods of avoiding the Rule's presumption are outlined. Part
II.B.1 shows how some modern courts have tried to avoid the Rule
by simply refusing to find a statutory infraction. Part II.B.2 shows
how other modern courts have imposed an elevated trigger for the
imposition of the Pennsylvania Rule by would-be proponents. Part
II.B.3 shows how several courts have realized the "substantive"
nature of the presumption and have acted accordingly with regard
to analyzing the Rule within an international context. Part II.B.4
concludes by giving examples of occasions when the Pennsylvania
7. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). See also infra notes
62-67 and accompanying text.
8. See Peck, supra note 6, at 101-02. See also infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Rule is either cancelled out by two litigants imposing it on each
other, or simply ignored and not applied by the courts.
Part III of this Note uses the understanding derived from Parts
I and II and explains why the Pennsylvania Rule is no more favored
by the courts today than it was in the past. By examining the Rule
in light of the three driving justifications behind the imposition of
presumptions in general, and by keeping in mind that the Rule is
much more forceful than an average presumption, Part III argues
that the Pennsylvania Rule should be discarded in light of modern
circumstances.
Ultimately, this Note argues that the effectiveness of the
Pennsylvania Rule has been muted by comparative fault and that
the Rule is no longer needed in light of modern technological
advancements for determining causative fault. By examining a good
sampling of recent case law from across the circuits, this Note's
argument is subtly bolstered by modern courts, which have found a
number of unique ways to avoid the Rule. This Note indicates that
the Rule's presumption is indeed drastic and unprecedented and
that it functions more as a substantive rule of law than as a mere
procedural rule of evidence. In essence, this Note asserts that it is
now no longer efficient, purposeful, or equitable to retain the
Pennsylvania Rule."
I. THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE EXPLAINED
A. Birth of the Rule
Among students of maritime law, the age-old, judge-made
Pennsylvania Rule needs no introduction. 2 Nevertheless, the
logical rationale espoused by the Rule did not originate with the
11. Most recently, a July 2007 Second Circuit opinion stated that the Pennsylvania Rule
is widely criticized and "appears to be, today, rejected by all maritime states other than the
United States." In re Otal Invs. Ltd., 494 F.3d 40, 50 (2d Cir. 2007). Judge Peter W. Hall went
on to note that scholars have pushed for the Rule's abrogation, "either by the Supreme Court
or by an act of Congress." Id. (quoting REGINALD G. MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA 53 (13th ed.
2003)).
12. Indeed, the Pennsylvania Rule has become one of the most frequently cited maritime
decisions of the Supreme Court. See Michael Ben-Jacob, Note, The Pennsylvania Rule: Murky
Waters Revisited, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1779, 1783-84 (1998).
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Supreme Court's landmark decision in 1873 of the same name.3 In
an 1847 opinion arising from the collision of two steamboats on the
Mississippi River north of New Orleans, 4 the Supreme Court
foreshadowed the Pennsylvania Rule when it stated: "[I]f ... neglect
... of the law shall be proved to exist when injury shall occur to
persons or property, it would throw upon the ... steamboat by whom
the law has been disregarded the burden of proof, to show that the
injury done was not the consequence of it."'" Similarly, when a yacht
and a schooner collided on New York City's East River in 1863,16 the
Supreme Court's 1868 opinion echoed: "Where fault is shown on the
part of the damaging vessel, it is incumbent on her to show that
such fault had in no degree the relation of cause and effect to the
accident."' 7 Then, in 1871, the Supreme Court's opinion regarding
an 1865 collision between a brig and a steamer off the coast of New
Jersey" proclaimed: "Every doubt as to the performance of the duty,
and the effect of non-performance, should be resolved against the
vessel sought to be inculpated until she vindicates herself by
testimony conclusive to the contrary."'19
Two years later, in 1873, the Supreme Court issued what is now
known as the Pennsylvania Rule in its popular form.2° The case
arose from a collision between the British bark Mary Troop and the
British steamer Pennsylvania.2 The June 1869 collision occurred at
ten o'clock in the morning in a dense fog on the high seas, approxi-
mately 200 miles from Sandy Hook, New Jersey.22 Despite the fact
that the Mary Troop was moving at only one mile per hour as the
Pennsylvania bore down on her at seven knots per hour,23 the
evidence showed that the Mary Troop sounded only a bell, even
though she was under a statutory obligation to sound a foghorn
13. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
14. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 442-43 (1847).
15. Id. at 465.
16. The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196, 196 (1868).
17. Id. at 203 (citing Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 465).
18. The Ariadne, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 475, 475 (1871).
19. Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
20. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
21. Id. at 126-27.
22. Id. at 126.
23. Id. at 127. Seven knots per hour is just slightly faster than eight miles per hour.
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while underway in fog.24 Thus, when the district court condemned
the Pennsylvania for the entire loss and the circuit court affirmed,25
the Supreme Court reversed and issued the formulation now
renowned as the Pennsylvania Rule:
[W]hen ... a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of
a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than
a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause,
was at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case,
the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her
fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably
was not, but that it could not have been.26
B. Characterization as an "Extra-strength" Morgan Presumption
The Pennsylvania Rule contains portions that are clearly
understood and portions that have been heavily debated. Generally,
commentators agree that the Rule is applicable only when there is
a violation of a statute intended to prevent collisions and injuries,
the types of which have actually occurred as a result of the statutory
violation.27 Stated more clearly, the Rule applies when the following
criteria are met: "(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of [a]
violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a mandatory duty;
(2) the statute or regulation must involve marine safety or naviga-
tion; and (3) the injury suffered must be of a nature that the statute
or regulation was intended to prevent. 28
Hence, an example formulation may be examined. First, assume
that a collision occurs between vessel A and vessel B in fog. Further,
assume a statute exists stating that vessels "shall sound a foghorn
in order to prevent marine collisions in fog." Now, assume that
vessel B did not sound a foghorn. Thus, the Pennsylvania Rule
24. Id. at 126-28.
25. Id. at 129.
26. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
27. Ben-Jacob, supra note 12, at 1786-87 (citing Folkstone Mar., Ltd. v. CSX Corp., 64
F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that failure of bridge operator to adhere to Army Corps of
Engineers' regulations caused collision), and United States v. Nassau Marine Corp., 778 F.2d
1111 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that failure to remove wreck pursuant to wreck statute caused
second vessel to strike wreckage and sink)).
28. Id. at 1787 (citations omitted).
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states that once B is shown to have not sounded a foghorn by a
preponderance of the evidence in violation of the statute, the burden
is upon B to show that B's failure to sound the foghorn "not merely
... might not have been one of the causes [of the collision], or that it
probably was not [one of the causes of the collision], but that it could
not have been [one of the causes of the collision] ."29
This "might not have been ... probably was not ... could not have
been" language is puzzling. Clearly, the Pennsylvania Rule is a
presumption of causation.30 As stated by the Supreme Court, the
Pennsylvania Rule utilizes the term "fault" as synonymous with the
notion of a "statutory breach" and presupposes that such a fault
already has been proved,3' ostensibly by a preponderance of the
evidence.32 Once this fault is shown, the Pennsylvania Rule then
imposes upon the violator the burden of proving that the fault
could not have been one of the causes of the collision.33 Thus, in our
example, once B's statutory fault has been shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence by A, the Rule operates to place the burden
upon B of showing that B's fault could not have been one of the
causes of the collision between A and B.
Akin to most other presumptions, some courts have held that the
presumption of the Pennsylvania Rule is a rule of evidence that does
not affect the substantive rights of the parties, but merely shifts
the burden of proof as to causation.34 Other courts, in contrast,
have held that the Rule is much more than a matter of procedure.
In Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States,35 the Ninth Circuit stated:
"[T]he Pennsylvania Rule is more akin to substantive law than to
rules of procedure concerned primarily with judicial administra-
tion."36 The Kisen court explained: "The shift in burden resulting
from application of the Pennsylvania Rule is two-fold. Not only must
29. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136 (emphasis added).
30. See NICHOLAS J. HEALY & JOSEPH C. SWEENEY, THE LAW OF MARINE COLLISION 46
(1998).
31. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136 ("In such a case the burden rests upon
the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that
it probably was not, but that it could not have been.").
32. See Ben-Jacob, supra note 12, at 1787 (citations omitted).
33. See HEALY & SWEENEY, supra note 30, at 46.
34. See Garner v. Cities Serv. Tankers Corp., 456 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing
Green v. Crow, 243 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1957)).
35. 510 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 881.
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the violator meet the burden of producing evidence to counter the
presumption of causation, but he must also persuade the trier of fact
that his explanation should be adopted."37 In this debate, even the
most knowledgeable commentators can disagree.
This Note does not purport to solve, definitively, the debate over
whether the Pennsylvania Rule is best classified as a matter of pro-
cedure or as a matter of substantive law.39 Nevertheless, this Note
does contend that, in function, the Pennsylvania Rule is most closely
related to what is popularly known as a Morgan presumption. The
majority of presumptions are known as Thayer presumptions, which
shift only the burden of production to the presumption's opponent.4 °
The opponent must then "meet the shifted burden of producing
evidence, but ... does not bear the ultimate burden of convincing the
trier of fact of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. '41 This type of
"bursting bubble" presumption is the kind embraced by the Federal
Rules of Evidence and is meant to disappear once the opponent
produces the sufficient rebuttal evidence.4 1 With Thayer presump-
tions, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the propo-
nent of the presumption.43 In contrast, a Morgan presumption shifts
37. Id. at 880 (quoting Warren B. Daly, Jr., Note, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New
Course for an Ancient Mariner, 54 B.U. L. REV. 78, 81 (1974)).
38. Compare 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTYAND MARITIME LAW § 12-3, at 769 (4th
ed. 2004) (stating that the Pennsylvania Rule is a presumption of causation, a matter of
evidence and procedure, but not a substantive rule of law), with HEALY & SWEENEY, supra
note 30, at 53 (stating that the Pennsylvania Rule is a rule of substantive law).
39. There are complex conflicts of law issues involved in this debate which are beyond the
scope of this Note. Part II.B.3 does note, however, that both the Ninth Circuit and, most
recently, the Second Circuit have considered the Pennsylvania Rule to be a matter of
substantive law, at least with regard to the Rule's impotency when a United States forum is
obliged to apply foreign substantive law. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to
highlight that, pedagogically correct or not, the conclusions of the Second and Ninth Circuits
attest to the severity of the Pennsylvania Rule's presumption. For a recent view of the
conflicts of law analysis inherent in this "procedural or substantive" debate, see Francesca
Morris, The Pennsylvania Rule: No Longer the Rule?, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 131 (Winter 2007).
40. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3.4, at 65 (3d ed.
1996).
41. Id.
42. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 139 n.1 (6th ed. 1994) (noting that Thayer "bursting bubble"
presumptions are the type adopted in Federal Rule of Evidence 301).
43. See 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 301.02[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2007).
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the burden of persuasion to the presumption's opponent." The
opponent must then not only produce evidence in opposition to the
presumption, but also convince the trier of fact that the nonexis-
tence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.45
Clearly, the Pennsylvania Rule cannot be a typical Thayer
presumption insofar as it also shifts the burden of persuasion onto
the Rule's opponent. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Rule, though
akin to a Morgan presumption, is also somewhat more than just a
normal Morgan presumption. A straightforward Morgan presump-
tion simply functions to force the opponent of the presumption to
convince the trier of fact that the presumed fact's nonexistence is
more probable than its existence.46 This language evidently tracks
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof applicable to
civil actions in general. But, the Pennsylvania Rule forces the
opponent of the Rule to show that said opponent's "fault ... could not
have been" one of the causes of the collision. 47 The burden of
persuasion thus placed on the Rule's opponent is simply a higher
bar.
This characterization of the Pennsylvania Rule as an "extra-
strength" Morgan presumption clarifies the reason why the debate
rages as to whether the Rule is a matter of procedure or a matter of
substantive law. Thayer presumptions, as embraced by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, are certainly procedural rules of evidence.48
Morgan presumptions, however, have considerably greater effect.49
And, at the opposite end of the spectrum, irrefutable presumptions
are simply misnomers: not presumptions at all, but substantive
rules of law.50 The problem arises when one attempts to fit the
Pennsylvania Rule somewhere between a typical Morgan presump-
tion and an irrefutable presumption. The 1873 wording of the Rule
seems to explicitly reject the idea that the Rule's opponent may
overcome his burden of persuasion by a mere "preponderance of the
44. See LILLY, supra note 40, at 65.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873).
48. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 43, §§ 301.02[1]-.02[2].
49. See LILLY, supra note 40, at 66.
50. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 43, § 301.02[1].
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evidence" standard, typical of most civil actions. 1 Thus, the farther
the "could not have" language of the Pennsylvania Rule moves the
burden of persuasion away from the typical "preponderance of the
evidence" standard of proof,52 the closer the Rule comes to becoming
a substantive rule of law. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Rule's
presumption of causation has been characterized as a "drastic and
unusual presumption.5 3
The burden of proof which is needed to refute the Pennsylvania
Rule's presumption is certainly "strict, but ... not insurmountable."'
Within just the Ninth Circuit, courts have, at different times,
understood the "could not have" language of the Pennsylvania Rule
as imposing either the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof, or the in-between "clear and convincing" standard
of proof upon the Rule's opponent.55 Thus, one commentator has
lamented that "[i]t may perhaps be regretted that the word 'could'
was employed in the statement of the rule in the Pennsylvania,"56
because this phrasing has encouraged courts to speculate as to
whether a statutory fault might have had any possible connection
to the collision.57
51. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136 ("In such a case the burden rests upon the
ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it
probably was not, but that it could not have been."). Clearly, a showing by the Rule's opponent
that his "fault" probably was not a cause of the collision is insufficient to overcome the
Pennsylvania Rule's presumption.
52. Moving away from the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof means, of
course, moving closer to the notion that the Pennsylvania Rule's presumption is irrefutable.
Certainly, that is not to say the Rule's presumption is, in fact, irrefutable. This Note merely
places the Pennsylvania Rule's burden of persuasion on the Rule's opponent as somewhat
higher than a "more likely than not" or "preponderance of the evidence" standard, but lower
than a presumption that cannot be refuted.
53. Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
54. Superior Constr. Co. v. Brock, 445 F.3d 1334, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
55. Compare Pacific Tow Boat Co. v. States Marine Corp., 276 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir.
1960), and State S.S. Co. v. Permanente S.S. Corp., 231 F.2d 82, 86-87 (9th Cir. 1956) (both
finding that the "could not have" language of the Pennsylvania Rule imposes a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof upon the Rule's opponent), with Churchill v. FN Fjord,
857 F.2d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 1988), and Trinidad Corp. v. Steamship Keiyoh Maru, 845 F.2d
818, 825 (9th Cir. 1988) (both finding that the "could not have" language of the Pennsylvania
Rule imposes a "clear and convincing" standard of proof upon the Rule's opponent).
56. JOHN WHEELER GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF COLLISION § 201, at 472 (1949).
57. See id.
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C. The Impact of Reliable Transfer
In 1854, the Supreme Court enunciated the Divided Damages
Rule,5" which then applied to cases of marine collision for over one
hundred years. The opinion was with regard to an April 1853
collision between two schooners near Squam Beach, New Jersey.' 9
Finding that both schooners had been at some fault, the Supreme
Court held that the damages should be equally divided, without
regard to the two schooners' comparative degrees of fault.6"
Since 1873 and prior to 1975, the combined operation of the
Pennsylvania Rule's drastic presumption and the Divided Damages
Rule resulted in much criticism. Under both rules, "a vessel com-
mitting a relatively minor statutory violation was made to bear half
the damages resulting from a collision if she could not disprove
causation"'" by showing that the statutory violation could not have
been a cause of the collision.
This potential for injustice may be illustrated by returning to the
hypothetical collision between vessels A and B in fog. After assum-
ing that B violated the statute, let it be additionally assumed that
A made an unannounced and last-second turn and collided with
B, because A did not see B in the fog. Here, equity might demand
that A bear the majority, if not all, of the loss because, without A's
ill-conceived change of course, no collision would have occurred.
Nevertheless, under the Divided Damages Rule, B would still be
held responsible for half the loss if B is unable to overcome the
Pennsylvania Rule's presumption, placed upon B by A. Once A
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that B did not sound a
foghorn in violation of the existing statute, the Pennsylvania Rule
forces B to show that B's statutory violation could not have been a
cause of the collision. Fair or not, should B fail to meet the burden,
the loss is split equally between A and B.
Eventually, just as tort law moved away from the rule of contribu-
tory negligence toward the rule of comparative negligence, American
maritime jurisprudence abandoned the Divided Damages Rule in
58. See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
59. Id. at 171.
60. Id. at 177-78 ("[W]e think the rule dividing the loss the most just and equitable, and
as best tending to induce care and vigilance on both sides, in the navigation.").
61. Peck, supra note 6, at 96.
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favor of a rule of comparative fault. The landmark 1975 opinion of
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co." arose from the December
1968 grounding of the coastal tanker Mary A. Whalen on a sandbar
off Rockaway Point outside New York Harbor.63 The district court,
despite finding that only 25 percent of the blame for the grounding
was attributable to the Coast Guard for failing to maintain a
breakwater light, while the remaining 75 percent of the blame was
attributable to the Whalen, nevertheless applied the Divided
Damages Rule and apportioned half the loss to each party.' 4 When
the Second Circuit affirmed, 5 the Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment after noting that the "rule of divided damages in admiralty
has continued to prevail in this county by sheer inertia rather than
by reason of any intrinsic merit."66 With strong language, the
Supreme Court ushered into the maritime realm the rule of com-
parative fault:
It is no longer apparent, if it ever was, that this Solomonic
division of damages serves to achieve even rough justice.... We
hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their
fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or
stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the
parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault,
and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only
when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible
fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault.67
In embracing comparative fault, the Supreme Court was, at least
in part, motivated by the potential unfairness of applying the
Pennsylvania Rule in conjunction with the Divided Damages Rule. 8
62. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
63. Id. at 398.
64. Id. at 399-400.
65. Id. at 400 (citing Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974)).
66. Id. at 410-11.
67. Id. at 405, 411; see also infra text accompanying note 205.
68. The Court noted that:
[T]he potential unfairness of the division is magnified by the application of the
[Pennsylvania] [R]ule ... whereby a ship's relatively minor statutory violation
will require her to bear half the collision damage unless she can satisfy the
heavy burden of showing "not merely that her fault might not have been one of
the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been."
Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 405-06 (quoting The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136
2320 [Vol. 49:2309
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Based on this logic, courts, in the immediate aftermath of the
Reliable Transfer decision, began to question whether Reliable
Transfer abrogated the Pennsylvania Rule. 69 But, the great weight
of the case law in a number of circuits shows that the Pennsylvania
Rule is still alive and well, happily coexisting within the framework
of a regime of comparative fault. ° The best explanation of how the
Pennsylvania Rule operates in conjunction with the comparative
fault doctrine of Reliable Transfer lies in the understanding of
Reliable Transfer as only a matter of how to assess liability,
whereas the Pennsylvania Rule addresses the issue of evidentiary
presumptions or burdens.7'
Let us return to the hypothetical collision between vessels A and
B in fog. Since both B's statutory violation in failing to sound a
foghorn and A's sudden, ill-conceived change of course may have
"caused" the collision, Reliable Transfer might allow us to assume
that a court may conclude that B's violation should make B 25
percent liable for the resulting damages, whereas A's sharp turn
should make A 75 percent liable for the resulting damages. This
apportionment of damages, however, would only be true to the
(1873)).
69. Peck, supra note 6, at 97.
70. See, e.g., Orange Beach Water, Sewer & Fire Prot. Auth. v. M/V Alva, 680 F.2d 1374,
1383 (11th Cir. 1982); Candies Towing Co. v. M/V B & C Eserman, 673 F.2d 91, 95 (5th Cir.
1982); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Hess Tankship Co., 661 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[The
Pennsylvania] [R]ule still floats, in the wake of... [Reliable Transfer] ... which only overruled
The Pennsylvania on the point of allocating comparative fault."); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. ABC Ins.
Co., 645 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that the Pennsylvania Rule enjoys continued
vitality in collision cases); First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Material Serv. Corp., 597 F.2d 1110,
1119 (7th Cir. 1979); Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1160 (2d Cir.
1978) (noting that the Pennsylvania "[R]ule's vitality and force were not in any degree affected
by ... [Reliable Transfer] ... which overruled The Pennsylvania only in so far as it abolished the
... [Divided Damages Rule] and substituted a new rule requiring liability for collision damage
to be allocated proportionately to the comparative degree of fault"); Feeder Line Towing Serv.,
Inc. v. Toledo, P. & W. RR. Co., 539 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (7th Cir. 1976).
71. See Peck, supra note 6, at 101. Note that the term "fault" is not always uniformly used.
In the Pennsylvania Rule, the "fault" is presupposed. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text. Hence, the Rule utilizes the term "fault" to mean a simple statutory breach. In contrast,
Reliable Transfer utilizes the term "fault" to mean "causative fault." See HEALY & SWEENEY,
supra note 30, at 53 (stating that Reliable Transfer permits apportionment of damages in
accordance with the degree of causative fault chargeable to each of the colliding vessels).
Sensibly, only "fault" that is "causative" of the resultant damages deserves apportionment of
liability. Thus, Reliable Transfer provides for an equitable apportionment of liability with
regard to the vessels' comparative "causative fault." In contrast, the Pennsylvania Rule
functions as a presumption of causation, once a statutory violation is found.
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extent that both B's violation and A's sharp turn were causative of
the collision. If we assume that B has no trouble in showing that A's
sharp turn was causative of the collision, all that remains is to
determine whether B's failure to sound a foghorn was also a cause
of the collision. Once A shows B's statutory violation, the Pennsylva-
nia Rule places the burden upon B to show that B's statutory
violation could not have been a cause of the collision. If B meets the
Pennsylvania Rule's burden, A would be found 100 percent liable for
all damages arising from the incident. If B fails to meet the Rule's
burden, B would be apportioned only 25 percent of the damages,
with A still being liable for the remaining 75 percent. No longer
would B's failure to meet the Pennsylvania Rule's burden result in
B being apportioned at least half the loss.
Thus, many commentators have argued that Reliable Transfer
eliminated the essential source of the harsh results produced under
the earlier co-application of the Pennsylvania Rule with the Divided
Damages Rule. In looking toward the future, one commentator in
1984 confidently stated:
[T]he courts today are both less likely to ignore or misstate the
Pennsylvania Rule and less likely to ignore or understate the
significance of the facts to which the rule might be applied. As
a result, the Pennsylvania Rule may well be healthier today
than it has been in many years.73
II. A HISTORY OF AVOIDANCE
A. Traditional Techniques
Because application of both the Pennsylvania Rule and the
Divided Damages Rule often resulted in harsh, inequitable results,
courts-prior to Reliable Transfer in 1975-utilized two other
doctrines of American maritime law to circumvent the problem.
First, the doctrine of error in extremis holds that when a vessel
72. See Peck, supra note 6, at 102; see also Richard H. Brown, Jr., General Principles of
Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 820, 836 (1977) ("[Ihe adoption of proportionate fault should argue
for the retention of the [Pennsylvania] [R]ule rather than its abolition, because the harsh
possibility of a vessel being held fifty percent to blame for a 'minor' statutory fault has been
eliminated.").
73. See Peck, supra note 6, at 102.
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meets a sudden emergency situation negligently created by another
vessel, and the former vessel takes a mistaken action in reaction to
the danger, said former vessel shall be exonerated from all liability
should a casualty occur in the process."4 Hence, when the Fifth
Circuit first dealt with the intersection between the Pennsylvania
Rule and the doctrine of error in extremis in Green v. Crow, 75 it
held that an action in extremis, even though technically a statu-
tory violation, is not characterized as a "fault" and, therefore, the
Pennsylvania Rule could not apply because, as a matter of law, no
statutory fault occurred. 76 Second, the Major-Minor Fault Rule
states that, if a vessel is found guilty of gross negligence in a
collision, the Pennsylvania Rule will not automatically apply, even
if the grossly negligent vessel can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the latter vessel was in violation of a statute designed
to prevent collisions.77
B. Modern Circumventions
If it is true that Reliable Transfer made the Pennsylvania Rule
less harsh, more equitable, and therefore more viable,78 then
modern courts should have little to no reason for wishing to
circumvent the Pennsylvania Rule. But, as a sampling of case law
from across various circuit courts from the past fifteen years shows,
courts remain as creative as ever in devising methods of not
applying the Pennsylvania Rule. In the remaining portions of Part
II, this Note identifies several methods by which modern courts
74. See, e.g., The Nacoochee, 137 U.S. 330, 340 (1890); Propeller Genessee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,461 (1851); Bucolo, Inc. v. S/V Jaguar, 428 F.2d 394, 396 (1st
Cir. 1970); Nat'l Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1950).
Nevertheless, "no emergency will excuse the absence of all clear thinking; after all, men,
charged with responsibilities of command, must not be wholly incapacitated for sound
judgment when suddenly thrust into peril." Cuba Distilling Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 143 F.2d
499, 499 (2d Cir. 1944).
75. 243 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1957).
76. Id. at 402-04. For a discussion of the dual usages of the term "fault," see supra note
71.
77. See Alexandre v. Machan, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893); see also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES
BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-4, at 492-93 (2d ed. 1975).
78. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
2008] 2323
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
have "weaseled" their way out of applying the Pennsylvania Rule's
"drastic and unusual presumption"79 upon a litigating party.
1. Not Finding a Statutory Violation
The Pennsylvania Rule is applicable only when a plaintiff shows
that a defendant was "in actual violation of a statutory rule in-
tended to prevent collisions."' Yet, the Rule does not further define
just what is a "violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent
collisions."'" Thus, some courts have gone out of their way to find
that no statutory violation of a rule intended to prevent collisions
has occurred. In so doing, the Pennsylvania Rule is simply not
triggered and need not be considered.
In a 1997 opinion arising from a March 1991 collision in the
narrow Malacca Strait between the commercial fishing vessel
Hui Kuo No. 16 and the civilian-crewed United States Navy oiler
Ponchatoula, the Second Circuit rejected the fishing vessel's con-
tention that the Ponchatoula was in violation of three statutory
provisions at the time of the collision.82 Looking at the three
statutory provisions, COLREGs 6, 7, and 8,3 the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision and held that the Ponchatoula
did not violate the three COLREGs. With regard to COLREG 6,
concerning safe speed, the court held that the Ponchatoula's speed
of 18 knots was not excessive under the circumstances, despite the
fact that the two vessels were in a narrow and densely traveled
strait, that other vessels were in the vicinity, and that at 18 knots,
it could take up to ten minutes for the Ponchatoula to reduce
speed.8" In addressing COLREG 7, regarding effective use of
RADAR equipment, the court held that the Ponchatoula's use of
"alternative methods" of "equivalent systematic observation" was
79. Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
80. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873).
81. Id.
82. Ching Sheng Fishery Co. v. United States, 124 F.3d 152, 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1997).
83. See INT'L MAR. ORG., CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR
PREVENTING COLLISIONS AT SEA 6-8 (Oct. 20, 1972). Popularly known simply as "COLREGs"
or collision regulations, these are the "rules of the road" with regard to vessel navigation on
the high seas.
84. Ching Sheng Fishery, 124 F.3d at 158-62.
85. Id. at 153-59.
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sufficient to meet the provision's mandates."6 Finally, the court
addressed COLREG 8, which requires the taking of timely action to
avoid collision, by holding that the Ponchatoula's eventual speed
reduction and evasive action to starboard was not "too little too
late," notwithstanding the fact that her master knew that proper
speed reduction from 18 knots would have taken over ten minutes.8 7
Accordingly, the Second Circuit refused to apply the Pennsylvania
Rule to the Ponchatoula.8
Another illustrative example of a court's refusal to find a
statutory violation is In re J. W Westcott Co.,"9 a 2002 opinion from
the Eastern District of Michigan regarding the October 2001
capsizing and sinking of the J. W. Westcott I on the Detroit River in
which two crew members were killed.s In a motion for summary
judgment, the J.W. Westcott II, a vessel which delivered "mail,
packages, and pilots to commercial vessels on the Detroit River,"
alleged that a statutory violation on the part of the Norwegian
gasoline tanker M/V Sidsel Knutsen played a role in causing the
casualty."' Because the tanker was a foreign vessel navigating in
the waters of the Great Lakes, she was subject to the Great Lakes
Pilotage Act (GLPA) of 1960,2 which demanded that "each foreign
vessel shall engage a United States or Canadian registered pilot for
the route being navigated who shall ... in waters of the Great Lakes
... direct the navigation of the vessel subject to the customary
authority of the master."93 Because the incident occurred while
Captain Hull, a Canadian registered pilot, was not on the bridge of
the tanker,94 the J. W. Westcott II maintained that the Pennsylvania
Rule should be applied upon the Sidsel Knutsen due to her violation
of the GLPA.s5 Nevertheless, upon analysis of the legislative history
behind the GLPA, the district court held that Captain Hull, in
86. Id. at 159-60.
87. Id. at 160-62.
88. Id. at 162.
89. 257 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
90. Id. at 892. On occasion, the Pennsylvania Rule has been pressed to apply to various
non-collision and non-maritime situations. See infra note 105, and text accompanying note
119. See generally Ben-Jacob, supra note 12, at 1807-09.
91. J.W. Westcott, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 892-93.
92. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 9301-08 (2000).
93. Id. § 9302(a)(1)(A).
94. J.W Westcott, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 892-93.
95. Id. at 893.
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instructing another captain on the proper course of the Sidsel
Knutsen prior to going below deck for less than two minutes, did not
fail to "direct the navigation of the vessel" within the meaning of the
statute. 96 Conveniently, the district court thus managed to side-step
the fact that the incident occurred while neither a United States
nor Canadian registered pilot was at the helm. Such "direction" of
another pilot, reasoned the district court, did not amount to a
violation of the GLPA and thus, there was no per se negligence
under the Pennsylvania Rule on the part of the Sidsel Knutsen.97
2. The "Causal Connection" Requirement
Despite the argument that, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rule,
"the burden of proof on the issue of causation [shifts] once a
claimant has established that a vessel has violated a statute or
regulation,"' courts have also held that "a plaintiff must establish
a nexus between a regulatory violation and his or her injuries as a
condition to invocation of the Pennsylvania Rule."99 This need for a
"causal connection" or "nexus" prior to successful invocation of the
Pennsylvania Rule presents another method by which courts may
avoid application of the Rule's presumption. By imposing this bar
upon would-be proponents of the Pennsylvania Rule, some courts
may be viewed as having imposed a de facto "evidence sufficient to
support a finding" standard upon such plaintiffs, forcing them to
"make some showing that the statutory violation may have had
some relation to the accident."'0'
96. Id. at 894-95.
97. Id. In so finding, the district court held that summary judgment against Captain Hull
was inappropriate. Id. Incidentally, the district court's mischaracterization of the
Pennsylvania Rule as a rule of "per se negligence" is interesting, though not germane to the
holding in the case.
98. Cont'l Grain Co. v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 972 F.2d 426, 436 (1st Cir. 1992).
99. Minott ex rel. Minott v. Smith, No. CIV. 03-10-PH, 2003 WL 22078070, at *12 (D. Me.
Sept. 5, 2003).
100. In re Complaint of Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1996)
("Indeed, a contrary rule, such as is urged upon us ... would result in a presumption of liability
following any statutory violation no matter how remote or inconsequential such a violation
may have been to the subsequent accident. Neither precedent nor logic compels such a drastic
result."); see, e.g., Am. River Trans. Co. v. Kavo Kaliakra SS, 148 F.3d 446, 450 (5th Cir. 1998)
('This court has stressed that the Pennsylvania Rule is a rule regarding the burden of proof,
not a rule of ultimate liability. As we have explained, the Supreme Court in The Pennsylvania
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In a 2003 opinion from the District of Maine °10 and its subsequent
appeal, which resulted in a 2004 opinion from the First Circuit,10 2
the widow plaintiff alleged that the shipowner defendant was
responsible for the wrongful death of her husband, the then-captain
of the defendant's fishing vessel that was lost at sea on a fishing
trip.10 3 Attempting to invoke the Pennsylvania Rule, the widow
asserted that, at the time of the incident, the vessel was in violation
of four different Coast Guard regulations.0 4 Although the shipowner
did not dispute the widow's argument that the Pennsylvania Rule
"has been extended beyond the confines of ship collisions to other
safety-related maritime contexts,"' ' he did dispute "whether proof
of violation of a Coast Guard regulation, without more, suffices to
trigger application of the [Pennsylvania] [R]ule."' ° In response, the
district court emphatically declared that a factfinder "could not,
except on the basis of sheer speculation, conclude that any of the
cited violations bore any relation whatsoever to [the incident].
[Plaintiff's allegation] is too insubstantial a foundation for invoca-
tion of the burden-shifting Pennsylvania Rule."10 7
On appeal, the First Circuit swiftly affirmed the district court's
decision and re-emphasized the logic that necessitated a prelimi-
nary showing of causation by the plaintiff prior to application of the
Pennsylvania Rule. 08 The circuit court reasoned that it would be
imprudent and "a departure from the limited and cautious manner
in which the courts ... have traditionally invoked this powerful
rule" 09 to speculate as to a scenario in which the burden-shifting
'did not intend to establish a hard and fast rule that every vessel guilty of a statutory fault
has the burden of establishing that its fault could not by any stretch of the imagination have
had any causal relation to the collision, no matter how speculative, improbable, or remote."'
(internal citations omitted)); Assoc. Dredging Co. v. Cont'l Marine Towing Co., 617 F. Supp.
961,968 (E.D. La. 1985) ("Although the rule of The Pennsylvania imposes a strenuous burden,
it does not negate the clear requirement of causation. While the defendants are guilty of a
statutory violation, the violation did not have anything to do with the capsizing ...." (internal
citations omitted)).
101. Minott, 2003 WL 22078070.
102. Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354 (1st Cir. 2004).
103. Minott, 2003 WL 22078070, at **2-9.
104. Id. at *10.
105. Id. at *11 (citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *13.
108. Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 364-65 (1st Cir. 2004).
109. Id. at 365.
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Pennsylvania Rule should be applied.11 ° Powerfully, the circuit court
admonished:
Assuming arguendo that the [v]essel was indeed in violation
of these regulations, ... the violation or "fault" must have
contributed to the casualty, at least in some degree.... [A]
plaintiff must establish a relationship between the regulatory
violation and the injury in order to invoke the Pennsylvania
Rule....
Here we have a casualty for which it is virtually impossible to
identify the cause.... Any number of hypotheses can be con-
structed as to what occurred on the [vessel] the night it was lost.
In some of these scenarios, the statutory violations might be
relevant, whereas in others, they would have had nothing to do
with the casualty.
To be sure, the Pennsylvania Rule authorizes some degree of
speculation as to the causes of the accident, but it does not
authorize the degree of speculation urged by the plaintiff here."'
Another example of a court imposing a "causal connection"
requirement upon a would-be proponent of the Rule is found in a
2005 opinion from the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which the
claimants attempted to invoke the Pennsylvania Rule upon the M V
Mr. Jason by alleging that the vessel violated several statutes in
causing the claimants harm by wave wash and suction. '2 First, the
district court found that the Mr. Jason had no properly licensed
master or captain on board at the time of the accident, in violation
of 46 U.S.C.A. § 8904(a)." 3 Next, the district court found that the
Mr. Jason was being operated without proper navigational charts
of the Intracoastal Waterway area in violation of 33 C.F.R.
§ 164.30."14 Finally, the district court found that the Mr. Jason
110. Id. ("[W]e are reluctant to impose a penalty for a statutory violation with no known
relation to the loss.").
111. Id. at 364-65 (citations omitted).
112. In re Quality Marine Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A.04-217, 2005 WL 1155854, at **3-4 (E.D.
La. May 9, 2005).
113. Id. at *3 (citing 46 U.S.C.A. § 8904(a) (2004)); see also 46 U.S.C. § 8904(a) (2000).
114. Quality Marine Serv., 2005 WL 1155854, at **3-4; see 33 C.F.R. § 164.30 (2006).
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violated 33 U.S.C.A. § 2034(c)(1) when it did not sound its horn to
give notice that it would attempt to pass.115
Noticeably, when applying the Pennsylvania Rule, the district
court made it clear that only the first two statutory violations
involved violations of statutes that "were intended to prevent the
kind of injury that allegedly occurred.""' 6 Dealing with the violation
of 33 U.S.C.A. § 2034(c)(1), the district court expressly found that
the particular violation at issue did not justify the application of the
Pennsylvania Rule insofar as "[i]t would stretch the bounds of
reason ... to conclude that a law requiring notice of an overtaking
was intended, even tangentially, to prevent injury caused by wave
wash and suction.""' 7 Nevertheless, given the established relevance
of the first two statutory violations, the district court applied the
Pennsylvania Rule to the case, imposing the burden upon the Mr.
Jason to show that its two statutory violations could not have been
a cause of the damages suffered by the claimants." 8 In its careful
differentiation of the third statutory violation, however, the district
court essentially maintained that the Pennsylvania Rule does not
give a claimant carte blanche to over-speculate as to whether the
defendant's alleged statutory violations caused the damages suf-
fered by the claimant.
Despite the notion that the Pennsylvania Rule may be utilized in
other non-marine or non-collision contexts, 119 courts have also used
the "causal connection" limitation to curb extension of the Rule into
too many other contexts. In Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp.,120 a widow
plaintiff filed a complaint under the Jones Act21'-on behalf of her
115. Quality Marine Serv., 2005 WL 1155854, at *4 (citing to 33 U.S.C.A. § 2034(c)(1)
(2004)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2034(c)(1) (2000).
116. Quality Marine Serv., 2005 WL 1155854, at *4.
117. Id.
118. Id. at **4-5.
119. See supra notes 90, 105 and accompanying text.
120. No. 98 CIV. 7126 (RPP), 2002 WL 140542 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2002). This opinion and
order from the Southern District of New York in response to the defendant's motion in limine
and motion for summary judgment should be differentiated from the opinion of the Second
Circuit previously cited in this Note. See supra notes 1, 53, 79.
121. The Jones Act is really several pieces of legislation. First, the Act restricts the carriage
of goods between U.S. ports to U.S. flagged vessels built in the United States. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2000). The Jones Act also allows injured sailors and the next of kin of deceased
sailors to obtain damages from their employers for the negligence of the shipowner, the
captain, or fellow members of the crew. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2000) ("A seaman injured in
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late husband-against the defendants for wrongful death as a result
of exposure to toxic chemicals while working on the defendants'
vessels.'22 In the context of an otherwise unrelated motion in limine,
the district court examined the widow's reliance on the Pennsylva-
nia Rule when the widow alleged statutory violations on the part of
the defendants. 123 In acting similarly to the District of Maine and
the First Circuit,'24 the Southern District of New York voiced serious
doubt as to the applicability of the Pennsylvania Rule in cases of
wrongful death under the Jones Act 12' and noted the lack of a
"causal connection" between the injury and any alleged statutory
violations by the defendants. 126 Though the Amerada court stopped
short of explicitly stating that the Pennsylvania Rule does not apply
in all Jones Act cases, other earlier courts have held in such a
manner. 127
3. The Rule and the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910
Due to the confusion as to whether the Pennsylvania Rule is a
procedural rule of evidence or a substantive rule of law,128 invocation
of the Rule in an international setting presents a particularly
thorny problem when an American forum is obligated to apply
foreign substantive law. More specifically, the Brussels Collision
the course of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative
of the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against
the employer.").
122. Amerada, 2002 WL 140542, at *1.
123. Id. at **15-17.
124. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
125. Amerada, 2002 WL 140542, at *16 ("Accordingly, the reliance of the Seaboard court
on The Pennsylvania does not support reliance on The Pennsylvania in a wrongful death
claim, the situation in this case." (citing In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1971))); id. ("The Pennsylvania ... should not be extended 'beyond the chosen area of ship
collisions to embrace Jones Act cases."' (quoting Wilkins v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.,
446 F.2d 480, 486 (2d Cir. 1971))).
126. Id. at **16-17 ("[The] [p]laintiff must show evidence of a causal connection between
[the] [d]efendants' alleged violation of Coast Guard regulations and the [p]laintiff's injury.").
127. See, e.g., Mawari v. Interocean Ugland Mgmt. Corp., No. CIV.A.98-4779, 1999 WL
820454, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1999) (noting that the Pennsylvania Rule does not apply in a
Jones Act case in the Third Circuit).
128. See supra Parts I.B-C.
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Convention of 1910, of which the United States is not a signatory,'29
contains an Article 6, which states that "[t]here shall be no legal
presumptions of fault in regard to liability for collision."' ° Few
courts have wrestled with the problem of what becomes of the
Pennsylvania Rule when substantive international law, namely
the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, is applicable to litigation
in an American forum. In 1975, the Ninth Circuit became one of
the first to address this problem in Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United
States. 3'
On the morning of December 21, 1967, a collision occurred in
Kure Harbor, Japan, between the Japanese hydrofoil Kinsei-Go and
the United States Army vessel J-3 793.' Although international law
dictated that it was the duty of the Kinsei-Go to alter course, 133 that
mandate was modified by Japanese Port Regulations, which stated
that non-miscellaneous vessels, such as the J-3793, must fly their
call signs while in Kure Harbor and that miscellaneous vessels must
give way to non-miscellaneous vessels.33 As the J-3793 was not
flying her call sign,'35 the Kinsei-Go argued, the Pennsylvania Rule
should operate to place the burden upon the J-3793 to show that the
call sign violation could not have been a cause of the collision. 136 In
applying Article 6 of the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, the
Ninth Circuit held that, although not intended to make inoperative
all presumptions, Article 6 does void application of the Pennsylvania
Rule in that the Pennsylvania Rule "establishes an almost insur-
mountable burden of proof that virtually insures that some liability
will be imposed upon the ship that is charged with such a burden.
It strains reason to insist that it is not a legal presumption of fault
'in regard to liability for collision."
131
129. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collisions
Between Vessels, Sept. 23, 1910, reprinted in 6 ERASTUS C. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN
ADMIRALTY 3-7 (Arnold Whitman Knauth ed., 6th ed. 1941) [hereinafter Convention].
130. Id. at 5.
131. 510 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 877.
133. Id. at 878 n.2.
134. Id. at 878.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 878-79.
137. Id. at 883. Although there is some debate as to whether a proper translation of Article
6 voids presumptions put into place by both statutes and judge-made rules, Judge Sneed of
the Ninth Circuit held that the judge-made nature of the Pennsylvania Rule was not sufficient
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Herein lies a tricky problem. At first, it may seem illogical to
conclude that Article 6 of the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910,
which voids "presumptions of fault," ' should be interpreted also to
void application of the Pennsylvania Rule, which is a presumption
of causation.3 9 The understanding lies in the fact that, like the
Reliable Transfer court, the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910
utilized the term "fault" in Article 6 also to mean "causative
fault,"'4 ° distinct from the Pennsylvania Rule's use of the word
"fault" as meaning a mere presupposed statutory breach, without
the additional consideration of causation.' The Rule itself then
operates upon the presupposed breach in the form of a presumption
of causation. Thus, Reliable Transfer held that liability should be
apportioned with regard to the parties' comparative "causative
fault,"'4 whereas Article 6 insists that such "causative fault" should
not be presumed. 43
Since the Pennsylvania Rule's drastic presumption of causation
operates on a presupposed "fault," to the extent that it may arguably
impose the same burden of proof on the Rule's opponent as society
imposes on a criminal prosecutor,' the Rule is most appropriately
regarded as not being reconcilable with Article 6.14 Logically, there
is certainly little difference between a presumption of "causative
fault," and a presumption that a "fault" was "causative," for concern
is only with 'fault' which includes blameworthiness as well as
to save it from being rendered inoperative by Article 6. Id. at 882 ('We believe that Article 6
is addressed to presumptions such as the Pennsylvania Rule without regard to whether they
rest on judicial or legislative authority.").
138. See Convention, supra note 129, at 5.
139. See HEALY & SWEENEY, supra note 30, at 46.
140. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also HEALY & SWEENEY, supra note 30,
at 52 (noting that "fault" in the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910 has been interpreted
as a term of art meaning "causative fault").
141. See supra notes 31, 71 and accompanying text.
142. See HEALY & SWEENEY, supra note 30, at 52-53.
143. See Convention, supra note 129, at 5.
144. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
145. See generally HEALY & SWEENEY, supra note 30, at 49-53 (arguing that the
Pennsylvania Rule is a substantive rule of law and a legal presumption of "fault," as that term
is used in the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, which abolishes such presumptions).
Note that one of the main reasons why the United States did not sign the Convention was the
inclusion of Article 6, which was interpreted as addressing presumptions such as the
presumption of causation under the Pennsylvania Rule. See id. at 49 (citing S. EXEC. REP. No.
75-4 (1938)).
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causation. And no true apportionment [of liability] can be reached
unless both factors are borne in mind."'
146
Thus, when litigation regarding Article 6 and the Pennsylvania
Rule surfaced again as a result of a 2002 collision in the English
Channel between the M/V Kariba and the M/V Tricolor, the
Southern District of New York denied the Kariba's attempt to
invoke the Pennsylvania Rule upon a third vessel, the M/VClary'47
In so doing, Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York echoed
the Kisen court's interpretation of the interaction between the
Pennsylvania Rule and Article 6 of the Brussels Collision Conven-
tion of 1910, stating:
The [Kisen] Court found that the Pennsylvania Rule is substan-
tive and not a procedural rule of the forum because it is a rule
designed to affect the decision of the issue rather than simply
"regulate the conduct of the trial." In other words, it is outcome
determinative-it is possible, but not likely, that the vessel
guilty of a statutory violation will be able to establish that the
violation could not reasonably be held to have been a proximate
cause of the collision. As a substantive rule, the [Kisen] Court
held, it should not be applied to a case simply because it is a law
of the forum. When applied to the facts here, I agree with this
reasoning. Put another way, the Pennsylvania Rule is not
appropriate in this action.
148
On appeal, Judge Hall of the Second Circuit roundly applauded
the district court's analysis of the Rule and affirmed it to be
substantive and, thus, not applicable to situations involving the
Brussels Collision Convention of 1910.' Judge Hall noted the
outcome-determinative nature of the Pennsylvania Rule and found
it to be far more than a device that merely regulates conduct at
146. Id. at 52 (citing Henry V. Brandon, Apportionment of Liability in British Courts Under
the Maritime Convention Act of 1911, 51 TUL. L. REv. 1025 (1977) (citations omitted) (noting
that the Maritime Convention Act of 1911 implemented the 1910 Brussels Collision
Convention in Britain)).
147. In re Otal Invs. Ltd. (Otal II), 2006 A.M.C. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 494 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Otal Invs. Ltd. (Otal I), 2005 A.M.C. 2461 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), aff'd, 494 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2007).
148. Otal 1, 2005 A.M.C. at 2464 (internal citations omitted).
149. In re Otal, 494 F.3d at 50-51 ("We agree the rule in The Pennsylvania is not a mere
procedural rule; it is, instead, substantive.").
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trial. 5 ° To be even more clear, Judge Hall then went on to dismiss
potentially contradictory prior case law in the Second Circuit as
"obiter dicta."'
151
4. Mutual Application and Non-application
As noted above, the coexistence of the Pennsylvania Rule with the
comparative fault doctrine of Reliable Transfer has made for fairer
adjudication of marine collisions.'52 Ironically, this modern inability
for proponents of the Pennsylvania Rule to defer "at least half the
loss" to another party has also made the Rule lose much of its
original bite.'53 In particular, as is often the case, when both parties
to a collision may show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
other party was in violation of a statute meant to prevent collisions,
the parties may invoke the Rule upon each other simultaneously.15
In such a situation, mutual invocation of the Pennsylvania Rule is
akin to the nonexistence of the Rule altogether, as "the burden on
each party cancels the other out."'55
In Inland River Towing, Inc. v. American Commercial Barge Line
Co.,'56 the MI VFloyd Goodman and the MI VRobert Greene collided
on the Lower Mississippi River in 1995 and each alleged that the
other was in violation of one or more of the Inland Navigation
Rules.'57 When the district court found that neither party had
proven that their violations could not have been one of the causes
of the collision, liability for the damages sustained was allocated
according to the comparative fault doctrine of Reliable Transfer.5 '
The district court then held that 70 percent of the loss should be
apportioned to the plaintiff Floyd Goodman, while the defendant
150. Id. at 51 (noting that the Pennsylvania Rule "does not serve simply to determine who
moves forward with the evidence, or to narrowly regulate the conduct at trial. To the contrary,
the [R]ule ... is so significant as to substantially 'affect the decision of the issue' of liability in
a collision.").
151. Id. at 51.
152. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
153. See George Rutherglen, Not With a Bang but a Whimper: Collisions, Comparative
Fault, and the Rule of The Pennsylvania, 67 TuL. L. REV. 733, 733-36 (1993).
154. See id. at 737-38.
155. Id. at 736, 738.
156. 143 F. Supp. 2d 646 (N.D. Miss. 2000).
157. Id. at 647-50; see also Inland Navigational Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-38 (2000).
158. Inland River Towing, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
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Robert Greene should be apportioned only 30 percent of the loss.159
Thus, despite the plaintiffs successful invocation of the Pennsylva-
nia Rule upon the defendant, the plaintiff, nevertheless, emerged
from the litigation with the short end of the stick, because the
defendant's successful invocation of the Pennsylvania Rule upon the
plaintiff cancelled out any advantage the plaintiff might have had
otherwise.
Another interesting case study is the Eleventh Circuit's 2006
ruling in Superior Construction Co. v. Brock, 6 ' which involved the
December 2001 allision"6 ' between Brock's pleasure boat and
Superior's stationary barge. 62 Roughly three and a half hours after
the allision, Brock's blood alcohol level was still 0.112, which ex-
ceeded the legal limit of 0.08 set forth under applicable statutes. 63
On the other hand, Brock alleged that Superior violated 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 409, a statute intended to prevent allisions caused by obstructing
navigation.6 To further complicate matters, the Oregon Rule, 65 a
general rule applicable to all allisions, states that the "presumption
of fault for the allision lies against the moving vessel."'66 In dealing
with the question of the intersection between the Oregon Rule and
the Pennsylvania Rule, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
The general rule is that the presumption of fault for the allision
lies against the moving vessel [(i.e., the Oregon Rule)]. This
burden of proof shifts, however, to the stationary vessel when
the stationary vessel is in violation of a statutory rule intended
to prevent accidents [(i.e., the Pennsylvania Rule)]. The station-
ary vessel then bears the burden of proof in showing that its
statutory violation could not have been a contributory cause of
the allision. In short, the burden of proof initially rests with the
moving vessel under the Oregon Rule. If the moving vessel can
159. Id. at 651.
160. 445 F.3d 1334 (lth Cir. 2006).
161. A collision is impact between two moving objects. An allision is impact between a
moving object and a stationary object. See id. at 1336 n.1 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75
(7th ed. 1999)).
162. Id. at 1336.
163. Id. at 1338 & n.6; see generally 33 C.F.R. § 95.020 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 327.35 (2001).
164. Brock, 445 F.3d at 1340; see also 33 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
165. See The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1895).
166. Brock, 445 F.3d at 1340 (quoting Sunderland Marine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weeks Marine
Constr. Co., 338 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (referencing the Oregon Rule)).
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establish the stationary vessel violated a statutory rule intended
to prevent allisions, however, then the Pennsylvania Rule shifts
the burden to the stationary vessel."7
Subsequently, in dealing with the various statutory infractions of
the two parties, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court
had enough evidence to conclude that Superior's statutory infraction
was the sole cause of the allision.'68 The circuit court, in dealing
with the application of the Pennsylvania Rule on Brock's moving
vessel, upheld the district court's finding that, despite legal
intoxication in contravention of various statutes, Brock satisfied his
burden of showing that his legal intoxication "could not have been
a cause of the allision."'169 The Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]his
appeal involve[d] one of the rare cases where a district court had
ample evidence with which to determine a boat driver's legal
intoxication could not have been a cause of the allision."'17 As part
of the appeal, Superior argued that the district court applied the
wrong standard of proof by repeatedly stating that Brock's legal
intoxication 'was not a cause of the allision,' rather than stating
that Brock's legal intoxication 'could not have been a cause of the
allision." ' 71 Nevertheless, the circuit court held that the phrase
"could not have been" is not a "talismanic phrase district courts
must recite to correctly apply the Pennsylvania Rule,' 7 2 and that
the burden of the rule "is strict, but ... not insurmountable."'73
Under such circumstances, in comparing Brock's non-causative
drunkenness with Superior's severely causative statutory violation,
the result hardly could have been any different, even if the Pennsyl-
vania Rule were not applied to either party.
Once the "cancellation effect" was applied by the Inland River
Towing court,7 4 it was as if the Pennsylvania Rule was never
applied at all, as liability was apportioned according to Reliable
Transfer. With this phenomenon in mind, one court recently saw fit
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 1343.
169. Id. at 1345-46 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 1345.
171. Id. at 1343 n.17.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1344 (citation omitted).
174. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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to dispense with the application of the Pennsylvania Rule alto-
gether, at least when things get a little too complicated. In Crowley
American Transport, Inc. v. Double Eagle Marine, Inc.,175 the
Southern District of Alabama was confronted with a collision
between two towing parties. 171 In March 1999 near Mobile, Ala-
bama, the barge Massachusetts was being towed into Mobile Harbor
by the tugboat Roland Falgout with assistance by three other
tugboats, the Alabama, the Mardi Gras, and the Big Bear.'77 With
the onset of fog, all four tugboat captains received information that
the barge Crowley 407, towed by the tugboat Choctaw Eagle and
assisted by the tugboat Ervin Cooper, was coming up from behind
in the river.' Upon arrival at the dock, the swift current, fog, and
darkness made the docking procedure difficult for the Massachusetts
and the four accompanying tugboats.'79 With the Crowley 407, the
Choctaw Eagle, and the Ervin Cooper attempting to pass on the port
side and the Massachusetts drifting out of control, a collision
occurred between the Massachusetts and both the Crowley 407 and
the Ervin Cooper.8 °
The facts required the district court to sort through many details
with regard to the relative faults of the various parties involved.
Had the Pennsylvania Rule been applied by any or all of the parties
upon each other, the confusion certainly would have multiplied.
Hence, the district court made the following ruling with regard to
the applicability of the Pennsylvania Rule to the case at hand:
This Court ... need not specifically decide in this case whether it
need apply the ... "Pennsylvania Rule," inasmuch as there is
sufficient fault to be spread among the actions or omissions of
the Roland Falgout, Massachusetts and Choctaw Eagle and
"even without a specific, demonstrable violation of the [Inland
Navigation] Rules, liability can be imposed where negligence is
found."''
175. 208 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
176. Id. at 1254-60.
177. Id. at 1254-55.
178. Id. at 1255.
179. Id. at 1255-58.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1264-65 (quoting Movible Offshore, Inc. v. The M/V Wilken A. Falgout, 471 F.2d
268,274 (5th Cir. 1973), and Cole v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 432 F. Supp. 144, 145 (S.D.
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In so holding, the district court implied that, in this case,
application of the Pennsylvania Rule was not necessary and,
moreover, might create further confusion in light of an already
complex situation. Accordingly, with the facts at hand and without
resorting to the Pennsylvania Rule, the district court applied the
comparative fault doctrine of Reliable Transfer and held that the
Roland Falgout was 80 percent responsible for the collision, the
Massachusetts 10 percent responsible, and the Choctaw Eagle also
10 percent responsible." 2 In this manner, the apportionment of the
various vessels' comparative fault was accomplished without the
Pennsylvania Rule, which may or may not have been applicable to
any or all of the vessels involved.
III. THE CASE AGAINST THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE
Numerous commentators have maintained that the Pennsylvania
Rule should, and does, enjoy continued vitality today, in the post-
Reliable Transfer era, by asserting that it is now less draconian and
more equitable."8 3 Nevertheless, an investigation of modern case law
from across the federal circuits shows that courts are just as likely
today to circumvent the new "fairness" of the Pennsylvania Rule 84
as they were in the past to circumvent the traditional "unfairness"
of the Rule.185 This Note proposes an explanation for this puzzle.
This Note does not contend that the Pennsylvania Rule cannot
coexist with the comparative fault regime imposed by Reliable
Transfer. Moreover, this Note supports the contention that opera-
tion of the Pennsylvania Rule is made fairer and more equitable by
a regime of comparative fault, as opposed to the Rule's former
cooperation with the Divided Damages Rule. 6 But this Note does
argue that just as comparative fault made the Pennsylvania Rule
more equitable, it also made the Rule more impotent. By reevaluat-
ing the driving principles behind the Pennsylvania Rule, and
presumptions in general, in light of modern advances, this Note
Ala. 1977)).
182. Id. at 1267-68.
183. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 6, at 102; Ben-Jacob, supra note 12, at 1812-21.
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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opines that the Pennsylvania Rule in its modern form is outdated,
ineffective, and should be retired.
Typically, three major arguments exist to legitimize the utiliza-
tion of presumptions as a general proposition. They may be
characterized as reasons of convenience, fairness, and policy.187
First, for the sake of both efficiency and economy, what is likely to
be true may be presumed to be true in the absence of any evidence
pointing to an opposite conclusion. 8 Next, it is both logical and fair
to put the burden of producing evidence upon the party who has
better access to the evidence."8 ' Finally, it is presumably good for
the sake of deterrence and enforcement of adherence to marine
safety statutes and regulations to place the burden upon the alleged
statutory violator.' Nevertheless, analysis of these three motiva-
tions confirms that the Pennsylvania Rule is no longer viable. This
Note contends that the Rule was, in fact, better at satisfying the
three reasons mentioned above before Reliable Transfer and the
onset of modern developments than it is today.
Sobering is the realization that all pursuit of convenience comes
at a price. In a popular example, that which is shown to have been
properly addressed, stamped, and mailed by the sender is presumed
to have been received by the addressee.' With regard to this
presumption, the price is relatively low as it is extremely likely that
the shown fact, proper mailing by the sender, ultimately concludes
in the presumed fact, proper receipt by the receiver.'92 There is no
such strong connection between shown fact and presumed fact with
regard to the Pennsylvania Rule's presumption of causation. Of the
multitudes of statutes and regulations that currently exist with the
intention of preventing marine collisions,' the violation of any one
187. See JAMES, JR., supra note 4, at 758-62.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.; see also Ben-Jacob, supra note 12, at 1818 ('The purpose of the [Pennsylvania]
[R]ule is grounded in deterrence." (citation omitted)).
191. See JAMES, JR., supra note 4, at 760-61. This is the ever-popular "mailbox rule."
192. See, e.g., U.S. POSTAL SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2005), available at http://www.usps.
com/history/anrpt05/usps-ar05.pdf (indicating delivery of 98,071 million units of first-class
mail in 2005).
193. See, e.g., supra notes 83, 157 and accompanying text (addressing the COLREGs and
Inland Navigational Rules); see generally supra Part II.B (highlighting case law addressing
a variety of alleged statutory and regulatory breaches).
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given statute or regulation is certainly not "extremely likely" to
result in a collision or casualty.
In addition, as the cases have shown, not every collision has, as
a causative factor, a particular statutory or regulatory violation that
existed at the time. 9 4 This lack of a "strong connection" with regard
to causation between a particular violation and a collision is the
exact reason why many courts have refused to apply the Pennsylva-
nia Rule in cases where the Rule's proponent could not even produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding of a "causal connection"
between the alleged violation and the collision.'95 Simply put, the
rate of error, or the price to be paid for the convenience of the
Pennsylvania Rule, is far too high to be acceptable under modern
standards.
In terms of fairness, it indeed seems fair, when faced with a lack
of producible evidence, to put the burden of producing exonerating
evidence upon the statutory violator. Simply, if all that may be
shown in the collision between A and B is that B violated a statute
designed to prevent collisions, and neither A nor B can proffer more
as to the incident's cause, the Pennsylvania Rule's presumption
serves to presume that B was at fault, unless B can indicate
otherwise. Such a presumption may have certainly been wise in past
centuries, as commentators are quick to point out that "[u]nlike on
land, it is rare to have a disinterested witness to a maritime
collision or stranding. Therefore ... the [Pennsylvania] [R]ule can
provide a convenient mechanism for courts to simplify the adjudica-
tion of collision cases."'96 Yet, with the Pennsylvania Rule, adjudica-
tion has certainly not been simplified in recent years to the point
that it may be simpler at times to not apply the Rule at all.'97
Clearly, in modern times, there is not a dearth of unbiased
evidence regarding the causes of a collision, because technology has
stepped in to provide such evidence. 9 ' With the prevalent, often
194. See supra Part II.B.
195. See supra Part II.B.2.
196. Ben-Jacob, supra note 12, at 1821 (citations omitted).
197. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., In re Otal Invs. Ltd. (Otal 11), 2006 A.M.C. 106, 109- 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affid
in part, rev'd in part, 494 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (relying in large part on evidence and data
recorded by ship navigation systems and shore-based RADAR systems); see also Paige Hess,
Note, Applying The Pennsylvania Rule-Circumstances to Consider in Allisions: American
River Transportation Co. v. M/V Kavo Kaliakra, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 343,352 n.102 (1999) ("For
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mandatory, use of devices and technology such as RADAR, Auto-
matic Identification Systems (AIS), Electronic Chart Display and
Information Systems (ECDIS), Long Range Identification and
Tracking systems (LRIT), and Voyage Data Recorders (VDR), a
vessel's every move is monitored and recorded.' 99 Additionally,
shore-based Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) 20 and the establishment
of Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS)21 in heavily trafficked areas
further serve to monitor shipping lanes, assist in navigation, and
reduce the number of collisions. Gone are the days when either no
one lived to tell the tale of a collision or adjudication could only rely
on a contest of "he said, she said. 2 °2
As for the third reason of pursuing good social policy, it cannot
be argued that deterring breaches of statutes and regulations and
attaining maritime safety objectives are not good social policies.
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Rule is not a conduit through which
such noble objectives may be properly met. The issue of deterrence
was, logically, more properly addressed by the Pennsylvania Rule
prior to Reliable Transfer. In a world of divided damages, a vessel
had more incentive not to violate statutes meant to avoid collisions,
because, upon a statutory violation and the subsequent invocation
example, onboard electronic logs and the availability of satellite photographs make it
significantly easier to reconstruct an accident as it happened without turning to
presumptions. In short, a scalpel can now be used to achieve a fair result whereas mallets
have previously been employed by the courts.").
199. See IMO and the Safety of Navigation, http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.
asp?topic-id=278 (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) (supplying hyperlinks to explanations of the
usage of such systems as AIS, ECDIS, LRIT, and VDR).
200. See id. (also providing a link to information about VTS).
201. Traffic Separation Schemes, established by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), have made many of the world's most congested waterways safer. See INT'L MAR. ORG.,
Focus ON IMO: IMO AND THE SAFETY OF NAVIGATION 8-10 (1998), available at http://www.
imo.org/includes/blastbindoc.asp?docid=537&format=PDF.
202. In an interesting concurring opinion, Judge Newman of the Second Circuit wrote at
length with regard to the marvels of modern maritime technology in 2007. In re Otal Invs.
Ltd., 494 F.3d 40,64-67 (2d Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., concurring). Specifically, while discussing
the wonders of such technology as a fine potential source of evidence for post-collision
adjudication, Judge Newman lamented the minimal use of that very same technology for
collision avoidance. Id. at 65-67 (discussing Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA), which
calculate Closest Point Approach (CPA), shore-based RADAR, VHF radios, AIS, Global
Position Systems (GPS), and VDR, but admonishing that "in the 21st century, ... we can do
better at reducing the risk of ship collisions"). Problems of under-utilization aside, this Note
contends that modern technology is fully capable of supplying good post-collision evidence, a
dearth of which originally justified, at least in part, the existence of the Pennsylvania Rule.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of the Pennsylvania Rule, the vessel would be hard-pressed to avoid
either half or the entire loss being imposed upon her. °3 After the
institution of a comparative fault regime, the same vessel opposing
the invocation of the Pennsylvania Rule upon her by another vessel
would only have to risk liability up to her own degree of compara-
tive, causative fault in the fight with regard to the element of
causation. 2 4 Thus, just as the Rule became more fair, it also became
less of a deterrent, one of the very reasons justifying the Rule's
existence in the first place.
Conceptually, the move from divided damages to comparative
fault was the Supreme Court's recognition that, by 1975, a sledge-
hammer was no longer needed with regard to apportioning liability
equitably and with acceptable precision. °5 And yet, the sledgeham-
mer of the Pennsylvania Rule still exists today with regard to the
element of causation. But with equitable apportioning of liability as
the ultimate goal and just adjudication of the element of causation
as a means to that end, it is nonsensical to retain the evidentiary
sledgehammer with regard to the latter, having done away with it
with regard to the former. 6 And when that sledgehammer is
admittedly difficult to use, in light of the pointlessness of its further
use, courts may simply not use it altogether. Insofar as deterrence
is still necessary and maritime safety is still a primary concern,
punishment of statutory violators in a criminal setting is well
within the powers of the legislature and the authority of the courts
in admiralty. °7 To the extent that such action has already been
taken with the purpose of deterring pollution on the high seas, the
same logic should be applied in order to deter actions causative of
collisions.
203. See supra Part I.C.
204. See supra Part I.C.
205. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. The reference to Solomon "splitting the
baby" is well appreciated. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
206. See Hess, supra note 198, at 352 n.102.
207. See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. HEALY, DAVID J. SHARPE & DAVID B. SHARPE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 67 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing a new line of anti-pollution laws, such
as the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA '90), which impose strict criminal liability upon
offenders); HEALY & SWEENEY, supra note 30, at 460-62 (discussing penal proceedings in
collision cases). For more on OPA '90, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000). See also Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000); Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
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The Pennsylvania Rule's presumption no longer effectively serves
any of the three above-listed justifications for presumptions. And
yet, one must remember that the Rule is not just a presumption, but
a "drastic and unusual presumption," which this Note has described
as an "extra-strength" Morgan presumption.08 If not already fairly
describable as a substantive rule of law, the Rule is about as close
as a "presumption" can come to being irrefutable. The Rule is
certainly far closer in scale to an irrefutable presumption than the
clearly procedural device of a typical Thayer "bursting bubble"
presumption." 9 In the end, despite the fact that the Pennsylvania
Rule may enjoy continued vitality today, the position that the Rule
should enjoy such continued vitality is indefensible.
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Rule is no more a darling of the courts and no
less "drastic and unusual" today than it was in years past. The Rule
is still as close as a "non-irrefutable presumption" can get to a
substantive rule of law, if it is not fairly describable as a substantive
rule of law already. Arguably, despite being less equitable when
used in conjunction with the Divided Damages Rule before 1975, the
post-Reliable Transfer utilization of the Pennsylvania Rule is, in
fact, less effective and less purposeful than before. Nevertheless, the
Rule remains shrouded in debate and is more trouble than it is
worth to apply today. For this reason, a study of modern case law
from various federal circuits indicates that the Rule's presumption
is dodged and avoided by the courts under numerous circumstances
with the assistance of various techniques. When analyzed against
a modern backdrop with the original justifications for not just the
Rule, but for all presumptions in general, the understanding is clear
that the Pennsylvania Rule has outlived its usefulness. The con-
tinued vitality of a rule of law cannot be justified by inertia alone.
Just as we have traded in the sledgehammer for the scalpel with
regard to apportionment of liability in marine collisions, it is now
time to officially retire the sledgehammer that is the Pennsylvania
208. See supra Part I.B.
209. See supra Parts I.B-C; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing why two courts have held
that the Rule is substantive enough to warrant non-application in light of Article 6 of the
Brussels Collision Convention of 1910).
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Rule with regard to causation. Clearly, many courts have already
unofficially done so.
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